Network-based metrics for assessment of naval distributed system architectures by Paparistodimou, Giota et al.
Network-based metrics for assessment of naval distributed system architectures 
Giota Paparistodimou1*, Alex Duffy1, Philip Knight1, Ian Whitfield1, Malcolm Robb2, Caroline Voong2 
1 University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK 
2 BAE Systems Maritime - Naval Ships, Glasgow, UK 
* Corresponding Author. Email: giota.paparistodimou@strath.ac.uk
Synopsis 
The architecture of a system is generally established at the end of the conceptual design phase where sixty to 
eighty percent of the lifetime system costs are committed. The architecture influences the system’s complexity, 
integrality, modularity and robustness. However, such properties of system architecture are not typically 
analytically evaluated early on during the conceptual process. System architectures are defined using qualitative 
experience, and the early stage decisions are subject to the judgement of stakeholders. This article suggests a 
set of network-based metrics that can potentially function as early evaluation indicators to assess complexity, 
integrality, modularity and robustness of distributed system architectures during conceptual design. A new 
robustness metric is proposed that assesses the ability of architecture to support a level functional requirement 
of the system after a disruption. The new robustness metric is evaluated by an electrical simulation software 
(MATPOWER). A ship vulnerability assessment software (SURVIVE) was used to find potential disruptive 
events. Two technical case studies examining existing naval distributed system architectures are elaborated. 
Conclusions on the network modelling and metrics as early aids to assess system architectures and to choose 
among alternatives during the conceptual decision phase are presented.  
Keywords: naval distributed system, evaluation indicators, network-based metrics, and robustness metric. 
1. Introduction
The early, rapid assessment and analysis of distributed system architectures on naval platforms has gained
increasing importance as detail and maturity is demanded much earlier in naval platform programmes. A 
distributed system is defined by Brefort et al. (2018) as “a specific type of system that is disbursed through the 
vessel”. The highly interdependent collections of the distributed systems that make up a modern naval combatant 
qualify them as a complex system. Complexity is suggested as a reason for the increase in costs and development 
time in navy ships (Dobson, 2014; Rebentisch et al., 2016). In respect to naval platforms, an essential requirement 
is that of survivability and the assessment of the vulnerability of a platform and its systems through the design 
process. Correspondingly, robustness reflects on the survivability and resilience of such complex systems  
A field that has flourished in recent years is the one of network science, which offers the basis for metrics that 
are useful in the engineering system context. Such mathematically driven metrics can potentially function as 
evaluation indicators offering numerical values for objectively assessing system architectures alternatives. This 
article investigates if network-based metrics can support early architectural decisions. Computing metrics as 
evaluation indicators can support designers to assess the architectures of their systems, and managers to make 
informed decisions among alternative options to develop the system architecture. 
The article explores a set of network metrics for assessing distributed system architectures. The network-based 
metrics focus on evaluating a system architectures’ properties such as complexity, integrality, modularity and 
robustness. A new robustness metric is proposed. MATPOWER and SURVIVE are utilised the first for evaluation 
purposes and the second to find the potential disruptive events. Next, the article applies a set of network-based 
metrics on two generic naval distributed system architectures. Finally, reflections on their potential to serve as 
early assessment indicators during the conceptual phases are given. 
2. Background literature
Early architectural decisions have a decisive influence on the connectivity of naval distributed system
architectures. Different decisions can arrive at distinctive distributed system architectures for the same technical 
specification requirements. Such distinctive system architectures can have different degrees of complexity, 
integrality, modularity and robustness. 
The connectivity amongst components of system architectures influences their structural complexity, 
integrality and modularity. Keane et al. (2017) recommended designing out complexity by proposing the ship 
density as a measure of complexity. The authors stated, “density measures how tightly systems and equipment are 
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arranged within a hull structure”. The pattern of the ship’s distributed system architectures affects the ship’s 
density. In the engineering design context, Luo (2015) used the interaction density metric to measure the integrality 
of system architectures. Rebentisch et al. (2016) assessed the changes in technical systems and their effects on cost 
and duration based on structural topological complexity. Gravil et al. (2014) investigated design modularity as a 
cost-effective solution for submarine life extension and capability preservation. 
A key design objective for a naval ship is to reduce design vulnerabilities, to increase ship’s survivability. 
Besides, robustness is suggested to enhance survivability. The Department of Defense (2011) defined robustness 
as “architectural properties and system of systems design feature to enhance survivability and resist functional 
degradation”. Moreover, Kott and Abdelzaher (2014) advised that robustness is a precondition for resilience. 
INCOSE (2015) describes architecting of systems as “an analysis of interactions between system elements to 
prevent undesirable properties and reinforce desirable ones”. The minimum necessary complexity is desired for a 
“good” architecture, and the most simple is the “best” design (Crawley et al., 2004; Maier and Rechtin, 2000): 
therefore, excessive complexity is an undesirable property of a naval distributed system architecture. A sufficient 
level of modularity and robustness are desirable properties in naval distributed system architectures, as the first is 
considered as an enabler to balance lifecycle cost and development times, whereas the second is a requirement to 
achieve resilience and survivability. However, robustness, modularity and complexity are interrelated. Crawley et 
al. (2004) acknowledged that “robust functionality drives essential complexity”. Raz and DeLaurentis (2017) 
examined the influence of modularity and complexity on survivability and dependability in system of systems 
architectures and suggested that “modular architectures are more dependable and survivable”. In contrast, 
Mehrpouyan et al. (2014) advised for complex engineering system designs that “modular physical system 
architectures that maybe have the unintended downside of making the system less tolerant to failure”. Therefore, 
assessing such properties of system architectures, together, can aid in understanding their trade-offs, and more 
efficiently architect systems. 
Scholars have proposed using network methods for analysing naval distributed systems (de Vos, 2014; 
Rigterink, 2014). Ship vulnerability has been examined using networks (Goodrum et al., 2018). Their low 
requirements for information to develop network models, allows them to be useful for the early design phases. 
This article investigates if complexity, integrality, modularity, and robustness as architectural properties are 
beneficial to be assessed early in the process and suggests a set of network metrics to perform this assessment. 
Baldwin and Clark, (2000) defined complexity as “the presence of many, varied parts, patterns or elements, 
connected in a way that makes an object difficult to understand fully”. The same authors defined modularity as “a 
property of a system where the system can be divided into a different number of [chunks] called modules, which 
have strong intra-connections within the individual module and weak interconnections between modules”. Luo 
(2015) defined integrality in system architecture as “if there are many inter-influence links among components”. 
In this article, the robustness of a system architecture is defined as “the ability of instantiated system architecture 
to support a level of functional requirements, after disruption”. 
3. System architecture network assessment metrics 
3.1. Complexity 
Sinha (2014) suggested that a graph energy metric could function as a measure of structural topological 
complexity and is the “sum of singular values of the adjacent matrix” and is proposed that “encapsulates the impact 
of topological differences in the connectivity structures, function as a measure of topological complexity” (Sinha, 
2014). The equation for graph energy is presented: 𝐸"𝐴$%& =(𝜎$*$+, 														(1) 
where 𝐴$% the adjacency matrix, 𝜎$ the singular values of network.  
3.2. Integrality 
 Interaction density metric (K) defined as the “average number of components that each component influences” 
and is interpreted as an indicator of integrality (Dong, 2002; Luo, 2015) in the engineering design literature. This 
refer to the average nodal degree of network science (Newmann, 2003). The equation is: 
     𝐾 = 2*																												(2)	
Where n the number of components (nodes), m the number of connections (edges). 
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3.3. Modularity 
In the broader network science literature, there is the well-known Newman modularity index (Q) (Newman, 2010). 
This metric has been adopted in engineering system literature by Sinha and Suh (2017) as per equation (3): 
 𝑄 = ∑ (𝑒$$ − 𝑎$9):$+,      (3) 
 
Whereas “𝑒$$: fraction of edges with both ends nodes in the same module i (intra-module connections),	𝑎$:   
fraction of edges with at least one end node inside module i (inter-module connections), k: number of modules”. 
3.4. A new robustness network-based metric 
In this article, a novel robustness metric to measure the ability of system architecture to support a level of 
functional requirements, after disruption, is presented. The metric evaluates the ability of architecture to maintain 
sufficient connectivity among sources (supply) and sinks (demand) components after a disruption. A threshold 
criterion is considered where the threshold corresponds to the minimal number of connections from sources to 
sinks required to support a level of functional requirement. For example, in a system where two of four generators 
(sources) must be connected electrical distribution centres (sinks) for regular electrical power functional 
requirement then the threshold criterion is defined as 0.5. Then an average of weighted combinations of source 
availability is formed to calculate the total robustness metric. 
Proposition: The architecture supports the system’s functional requirements if sufficient connectivity is 
maintained among sources and sinks after a disruption. Sufficient connectivity is associated with a threshold value 
that is decided based on the number of connected sources necessary to support the respective level of functional 
requirements. 
3.4.1. Formulation of the new robustness metric 
Measuring connectivity among sources and sinks before and after disruption 
For a system architecture that is represented a graph G, and has an adjacency matrix	𝐴$%, a new matrix S is 
constructed, that is a binary matrix that catalogues paths/walks (of any length) between nodes in the network:   S<= = 1 if and only if there is a path in the network linking node 𝑖 to node	𝑗. One straightforward way to compute 
S is to compute the matrix exponential 𝑒@ and then S<= = 1 if and only if the corresponding entry of the exponential 
is nonzero. For a number of “e” sources and “k” sinks, the sets of sources	s = {s,, s9, sD,… , sF} and sinks t ={t,, t9, tD,… , tI}	 are chosen in system architectures and the number of 1s in the corresponding intersection of rows 
and columns of S is computed. The proportion of 1s to 0s gives a measure of interconnectivity between the sources 
and sinks interconnectivity of the network. This can be recalculated after the network is subject to disruption (i.e. 
loss of nodes or edges). The measure works equally on directed and undirected graphs. More precisely, the 
robustness R of the intact system architecture is measured with the quantity: 
 RK,L(G)	=	∑ ∑ NOP(KO,LP)QPRSTORS FI                     (4) 
 
A disruption (loss of nodes/edges) generates damaged system architecture: that is represented a graph G′ , and 
has an adjacency matrix  𝐴′$% ,	and robustness is recalculated by evaluating the connectivity among sources and 
sinks after disruption to give: 
 	RK,L(G′) = ∑ ∑ NOPW 	"KO,LP&QPRSXORS FI 																			 (5) 
 
Both (4) and (5) can be computed for all non-empty subsets of S, in which case multiplying each term in the 
double sum by 𝑓$: an indicator variable set to 1 if source 𝑖 is on and 0 if it is off. 
 
Setting a threshold criterion 
A threshold criterion is applied based on the level of redundancy of the architectures and enumerate values 
of	RK,L which exceed the threshold criterion. For example, if triple redundancy the threshold criterion is defined as 
0.33, quadruple redundancy (require one source and architecture has four sources) then threshold criterion is 
defined as 0.25. To test the various combinations of sources, all cases with a common number of sources (i,say) 
available are grouped together and the number that satisfy the threshold criterion is the robustness, is denoted 
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by	R<. By varying the threshold criterion and calculating the robustness metric, the effects of the redundancy of 
the additional sources on robustness of the system architecture can be tested. 
 
Average of weighted combination of alive sources 
For a number of “e” sources, all 2F − 1 combinations of available sources are tested (excluding the case of 
all sources unavailable as that inevitably leads to loss of functional continuity). The information contained in the 
individual values of the robustness is condensed into a single term. This is done by calculating an average of 
weighted combination where the robustness of alive sources (R<) is weighted by a value inversely proportional to 
the number of states with i sources available (a binomial coefficient). Specifically, setting weight (w<) to be the 
reciprocal of the binomial coefficient e-choose-i, (experts input could also be used to inform the weight values) a 
weighted robustness (R]) is calculated: 	 R]	=		,^ ∑ w<R<<  																								(6) 
 
A total robustness metrics for a system architecture  
For a system with functional requirements l = {1… q} the total robustness (RL) of the system architecture is 
postulated as per equation (7), when these are combined to satisfy the main functional requirement of the system: 	RL =b		R]cd+, 																				(7)	
 
The equation (7) remains to be further investigated and tested. 
3.5. Robustness metric investigation 
In this article, MATPOWER electrical simulation software was used, for evaluation purposes. Firstly, the 
robustness metric is calculated, and then MATPOWER results are presented. 
3.5.1. Robustness metric results  
A generic system architecture of a ship power system is used here as an example. Figure 1 presents the generic 
ship power system architecture network. The system architecture is assessed if it can support the distribution of 
ship power from the sources (1, 2, 3, and 4) and sinks (11-22) after a disruption. Figure 1 presents the network of 
the system architecture 1,2,3,4 are generators, and 11-12 the electrical distribution centres-EDCs, the high voltage-
HV Switchboards are by 5-6 nodes, HV interconnectors by 25 and 26, transformers are 7 and 8 nodes, low voltage-
LV Switchboard 9-10 nodes, and LV interconnectors are 23 and 24 nodes. 
 
Figure 1: Network modelling representation of the generic ship power system architecture 
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Table 1 describes the calculation based to all the combinations of sources with sinks. A weighted factor (see 
Section 3.5.1) was included to consider for the different combinations. The architecture robustness metric is 
calculated for a target disruption of aft HV Switchboard to give an actual calculation of a simple example. The 
threshold criterion is here, defined as 0.5, meaning that the architecture requires two sources to support functional 
requirement. The architecture has total four sources (2 sources are for redundancy).  
 
Table 1: Robustness metric calculations for generic system architecture 
 
The average of weighted combination of robustness metric depends on the weights considered and the 
threshold criterion. These could be defined differently for the various system architectures and the functional 
requirements. 
3.5.2. Evaluation with MATPOWER 
In order to evaluate the results of the new robustness metric a network model of the ship’s power system was 
created and simulated using MATPOWER. In the first instance, the nominal maximum power throughput for each 
cable was calculated and the rating of each cable was calculated using a capacity multiplier, in line with Koc et al. 
(2013). Each node of the power network was sequentially withdrawn from service, simulating targeted disruptions. 
A power flow study was then re-run and the number of load served, generators online, and ratio of operational 
cables to total cables were calculated. The power throughput of each cable was assessed against its capacity and 
withdrawn from service if it was found to be overloaded. This process was repeated until a steady state was reached 
where final values relating to survivability of the network were calculated.  
 
Table 2: MATPOWER results for generic system architecture 
 
The empirical metric used in MATPOWER to evaluate robustness metric is also adopted from Koc et al. 
(2013). This article has defined link Survivability (LS) “as the fraction of lines that are still in operation after a 
cascading failure” and has the following assumptions: 1) “A line is considered to be operational if it is not tripped 
by the protection mechanism and if it is not disconnected from generators so that it still delivers power after the 
cascading failure”, 2) “The capacities of individual transmission lines are assumed to be proportional to their 
tolerance parameter”. Table 2 results indicate that 43% of the connections in the architecture remain operational 
after a disruption of the aft HV switchboard. The results generated from MATPOWER model presented Table 2; 
give comparable results with Table 1. Additional experiments and comparisons will be performed in future 
 
System Architecture 
 
 
Disruption event: 
Removal of 
aft HV switchboard 
Network robustness metric 
Weight 
combination (wi) 
Robustness 
metric (Ri) 
Sources: i=4 (four available generators) 
Sinks: All EDCs 1 1 
All combinations of 
Sources: i=3 (three available generators) 
Sinks: All EDCs 
1/4 2 
All combinations of 
Sources: i=2 (two available generators) 
Sinks: All EDCs 
1/6 1 
Sources: i=1 (one available generator) 
Sinks: All EDCs 1/4 0 
Average of weighted combination  0.4167 
 
System Architecture 
 
 
Disruption event: 
Removal of 
aft HV switchboard  
MATPOWER empirical metric 
Link survivability (LS) 
 
Sources: i=4 
 
0.43 
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research to evaluate the robustness metric further. In Section 5, the robustness metric will be applied in 
combination with other network-based metrics, to assess technical case studies system architectures. 
4. Technical case studies 
Two case studies are elaborated that examine existing naval distributed system architectures that have similar 
functional requirements from two different ships. These are: 1) providing and distributing power, 2) providing 
power for propulsion and steering, 3) providing chilled water-cooling for propulsion, power and weapons and 4) 
providing seawater cooling for power, propulsion and weapons. The set of sources and sinks corresponding to 
functional requirements are defined for the system architectures in Table 3. 
4.1. Description of the technical case studies and data collection approach 
Data collection was based on subject matter expert (SME) meetings and technical documentation including 
engineering drawings and technical specifications. The outcome was to describe the power, propulsion and 
auxiliary systems (chilled and LP seawater cooling) into a logical architecture (Brefort et al., 2018) using a design 
structure matrix (DSM) (Browning, 2015) and then transformed it into a multi-flow network. Only major 
components were included, for example; valves were not modelled. Flow relationships among components where 
represented in a directed network, which was converted into an undirected network that represented tangible 
structural connectivity (cables and pipes) among components. The flow-directed network was the basis to calculate 
the robustness metric, whereas, basis to calculate complexity, modularity and integrality metrics was the structural-
undirected nework. 
4.1.1. Case study A: System architecture A description 
Type A generates power through two diesel generators and two gas turbines alternators, which supply power 
to the high voltage (HV) system for the two propulsion motors and power to the whole ship systems. Gas turbines 
(GT) are dependent on the seawater system for cooling (GT Intercooler and GT Lubricating Oil Module). The HV 
switchboards are connected to transformers, which connect to LV switchboards, which supply power to the whole 
ship systems. The chilled water plants cool the transformers. The auxiliary seawater cooling pumps cool propulsion 
converters and motors. Overall, there are many dependencies between the power and propulsion systems and 
cooling. This suggests that Type A is an integral and complex architecture.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Electrical power and propulsion representation of system architecture A 
4.1.2. Case study B: System architecture B description  
Type B generates power with four diesel generators, which supply two propulsion motors mounted on the 
propulsion shafts, and power to the whole ship systems. Also, two gas turbines are connected to gearboxes that 
drive each shaft directly. Gas turbines lubrication coolers depended on seawater for cooling. The two 600 V 
switchboards are connected through two motor generator sets to the 440 V switchboard. The motor generators set, 
and propulsion motors required cooling through low-pressure (LP) seawater system. The chilled water system only 
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EDC 
4
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1
EDC 
2
EDC 
3
EDC 
5
EDC 
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8
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9
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LV Interconnector
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supplies weapons and other systems, thus does not influence the power and propulsion. Type B is considered a 
less complex architecture, as it has fewer dependencies to a simpler LP seawater cooling system architecture, and 
there are no dependencies between power and propulsion and the chilled water-cooling system. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Electrical power and propulsion representation of system architecture B 
4.2. Description of sources and sinks corresponding to functional requirements 
Table 3 describes the set of sinks and sources corresponding to the functional requirements for system 
architectures Type A and B, of the two technical case studies described in Section 4.1.1 and 4.1.2.  
 
Table 3: Functional requirement and their corresponding sources (S), and sinks (T) for Type A and B 
Functional requirement Corresponding sources and sinks  Type A  Type B  
1 Supply electrical power and distribute to EDCs 
S:  two diesel generators and 2 gas 
turbines S: four diesel generators 
T: 12 EDCs T: 6 EDCs 
2 Supply power for one propulsion and steering 
S: two diesel generators and two gas 
turbines 
S: two gas turbines and two of diesel 
generators 
T: two propulsion motors T: two propulsion motors or gearboxs 
3 
Supply cooling through 
the chilled water to 
power, propulsion and 
weapons 
S: four chilled water plans  S: three chilled water plans 
T: two transformers, HV & LV 
filters, fore & aft masts T: mast & sonar 
4 
Supply cooling through 
sea water to power, 
propulsion and 
weapons 
S: two LP, GT, and auxiliary 
seawater pumps S: two LP seawater pumps  
T: two propulsion converters & 
motors, GT intercoolers and GT 
lubricating oil modules 
T: two motor gen sets, propulsion 
converters and motors, GT 
lubrication coolers 
4.3. Disruptive events 
In SURVIVE software a generic ship power and propulsion systems based on a technical reference 
specification, and general arrangement was modelled as a reference platform. The SURVIVE software provides 
an assessment of the vulnerability of a whole ship, its systems and individual equipment against defined threats, 
allowing the evaluation and comparison of platform designs. SURVIVE was used here as a reference tool to find 
the disruptive events as inputs to calculate the robustness metric for the two technical case studies system 
architectures. The threat type was set as a generic missile striking the ship above the water line. For each strike, 
the set of irreparable equipment was extracted. The strikes start from aft of the ship and progress through the 
longitudinal direction forward – the first strike is at the most aft and tenth strike most forward of the generic 
reference ship.  
HV Switchboard 2HV Switchboard 1
Diesel Generator 1
LV Switchboard 2
EDC 
1
EDC 
2
EDC 
3
EDC 
4
EDC 
5
LV Interconnector
HV Interconnector
Diesel Generator 2 Diesel Generator 3 Diesel Generator 4
Motor Generator 2Motor Generator 1
LV Switchboard 1
Propulsion Motor 2Propulsion Motor 1
Gas Turbine 1 Gas Turbine 2
Gearbox 1 Gearbox 2
EDC 
6
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Table 4:  Example of various disruptive events extracted from SURVIVE  
Strikes Set of irreparable equipment 
1 1 x EDS 
2 4 x aft EDS 
3 5 x aft EDC  
4 6 (EDC, Propulsion converter and motor aft, HV aft switchboard, LV aft switchboard, aft transformer) 
5 1 x middle ECS 
6 6 (EDC, Propulsion converter and motor fwd., HV fwd. switchboard, LV fwd. switchboard, fwd. transformer) 
7 4 x fwd. EDS  
8 1 x fwd. EDS 
9 &10 No irreparable equipment 
 
Figure 2: Survive software Strike 4: An example of worst case disruptive scenario  
5. Description and discussion of the results 
The set of network metrics that was discussed in Section 3, were applied on the technical cases studies 
described in Section 4. The computation of the network metrics was performed in MATLAB using codes from the 
MIT Strategic Engineering (2006) and using the author' codes. All results from the set of network-based metrics 
are collected and tabulated in Table 5. The discussion is retrospective as both the system architectures exist and 
are in operation; however, it serves to exemplify the use of the set of network metrics and gains in forecasting the 
level of architectural properties such as complexity, integrality, modularity and robustness of system architectures 
during the early stages of the system development. 
 
Table 5:  Network-based metrics results 
Architectural properties measured by network-based 
metrics 
System architectures 
Type A Type B  
Complexity - graph energy (𝑪𝟑𝒏 ) 1.43 1.37 
Integrality - average nodal degree (K) 4.5 3.95 
Newman modularity (Q) 0.47 0.51 
Robustness (R w power) 0.83 0.83 
Robustness (R w propulsion) 0.87 1 
Robustness (R w chilled water) 1 1 
Robustness (R w seawater) 0.72 1 
Robustness (R total) 0.53 0.83 
 
The results of the network-based metrics show that Type A architecture is less modular, more complex, and 
integral than Type B. This agrees with the SME experience about Type A architecture because of its high density 
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of connectivity. On average, each component has a high number of connections. This characteristic signifies shared 
functionality amongst components in the architectures, thus lack of functional autonomy of components. This 
agrees with Newman modularity metric, which is lower for Type A architecture. The graph energy network metric 
is employed, as an indicator of architectural complexity, which shows that Type A architecture is more complex 
than Type B. This is in agreement with the technical case study as Type B system architecture is a less complex 
architecture, having less interconnectivity amongst its components and with simple auxiliary subsystems. 
Worst-case disruption scenarios for the system architecture is informed by SURVIVE software and are noted 
as strikes four and six as per Table 4. The robustness metric was calculated under this worst-case disruption based 
on Section 3.4.1. As explained in Section 3.4.1, a threshold criterion is defined that relates with the redundancies 
and the level of connectivity necessary to be maintained in the architecture after disruption to support a level of 
functional requirement. Herein, the threshold criterion is taken as 0.25, to allow comparisons among the different 
architectures, give that both are high in redundancies. The robustness metric test: if at least one source maintains 
connectivity with the respective sinks after the disruption. Calculated values higher than the threshold criterion 
suggest that the architecture is robust enough to support a respective level of functional requirement under 
disruption. Both architectures were found sufficiently robust to satisfy the threshold criterion defined. The total 
robustness metric is calculated as 0.53 for Type A architecture, which is lower than the 0.83 for Type B. This is 
primarily because of the high connectivity among the power, propulsion, and seawater cooling components of the 
Type A architecture, which is reflected by the robustness results calculated. By calculating a robustness metric 
under a worst-case disruption and comparing its results among the different architecture types, it could be assessed 
that Type A is inherently less architecturally robust than Type B architecture. Future research will additionally 
evaluate the robustness metric under diverse types of disruptions and technical systems. 
6. Comparison of robustness metric and other approaches 
Comparing among the three approaches it can be noted that: the SURVIVE can generate various types of 
disruptive events but does not focus on the low-level connectivity among the components of the interconnected 
systems, the robustness metric does not capture the location of the components in the hull of the ship, and the 
MATPOWER approach can only be applied to electrical systems. In general, network-based modelling and metrics 
are suggested as a basic abstract modelling method and the metrics as aids during early architecting conceptual 
decision-making process to help the development and agreement of baseline system architecture, and to be used 
in combination with traditional engineering tools. Limitations of network modelling and metrics are the 
assumption of similarity among the nodes, and the lack of details about the properties of the nodes. 
7. Conclusions 
In this article, a new robustness metric is suggested, to address the lack of an early analytical approach to 
assess the robustness of an architecture of distributed system architectures. The new robustness metric is applied 
in combination with other existing literature network-based metrics, to assess robustness, complexity, integrality 
and modularity of two naval distributed system architectures. The set of network metrics provided reasonable 
results, retrospectively for the systems. Such metrics could function as early evaluation indicators to support an 
assessment during the conceptual stage of system architectures. An early assessment of distributed systems can 
aid to make decisions and chooses that lead to architectures that are inherently less complex and integral, and more 
architecturally robust and could be more easily partitioned into modules. Future research will investigate how to 
incorporate such network-based metrics into a system architecture assessment approach as an aid during early 
conceptual design phase. 
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